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  The human brain is extremely efficient, but it is not a computer.  The brain has a limited ability to process
information but must manage a complex array of stimuli.  In response to its natural constraints the brain uses
shortcuts that allow it to perform well under most circumstances. [FN1]  Reliance on these shortcuts, however,
leaves people susceptible to all manner of illusions: visual, mnemonic, and judgmental. [FN2]  For example, people
process scenes in motion pictures as if the images actually move, [FN3] mis-remember the occurrence of events that
never happened, [FN4] and treat outcomes as having been more predictable than they were. [FN5]  People are
generally aware of these limitations, and they adapt to them so as to avoid disastrous consequences.  Social
institutions further facilitate such adaptations. [FN6]  An institution that plays as significant a role in society as the
courts has *62 surely adjusted to the brain's limitations and the illusions that these limitations produce.  If so, an
understanding of human cognitive processes can shed new light on how the law has developed and how it should
develop.  For example, central features of the legal system, such as the assignment of fact-finding and interpreting
law to different entities (juries and judges), might persist in the American legal system partly because they
ameliorate the influence of cognitive illusions.
  Scholars who study the implications of psychological phenomena for law usually assume that the courts are
ignorant of cognitive limitations and are therefore in need of reform. [FN7]  An understanding of cognitive
psychology, however, is not a prerequisite to accommodating the brain's limitations. [FN8]  For example, in
response to many of the deceptions that air travel perpetrates on the senses, airplane designers have created a set of
instruments to guide pilots, who must then learn to distrust the sensations they experience during flight. [FN9]
Airplane designers need not possess a detailed knowledge of human sensation and perception to realize that
mechanical aids are necessary to pilot a plane successfully.  An education in psychology would surely allow
designers to refine these adaptations, but even without such knowledge people and institutions easily avoid many
costly consequences of cognitive illusions.
  In other contexts institutions adapt to illusions of judgment, which are probably the most relevant set of cognitive
illusions to *63 the courts. [FN10]  For example, psychologists have uncovered a set of biases plaguing experts'
judgments that make developing foolproof complex systems or structures, such as nuclear power plants and large
buildings, difficult. [FN11]  Experts who design such systems commonly fail to foresee ways in which complicated
processes can go awry. [FN12]  In spite of this cognitive limitation most complex systems hold together well
because professions develop adaptations.  As one example, civil engineers are trained that in the course of designing
structural support for a building, they should estimate the support needed and then multiply their estimates by a
safety factor of somewhere between three and eight. [FN13]  Civil engineers cannot accurately estimate the amount
of structural support a building requires, [FN14] but even the most inaccurate engineer would not underestimate the
amount of needed support by more than the safety factor.  Consequently, despite the cognitive limitations of civil
engineers, buildings are safe.
  Many professions develop procedures to compensate for the limitations of human judgment.  Over the centuries of
their existence, common-law courts might have done the same.  Like engineering, the law is a learned profession
with a long tradition that presumably has had the opportunity to learn from its mistakes.  This observation implies
that the law has adapted to cognitive illusions of judgment.  Such illusions would not, therefore, provide a basis for
advocating widespread reform efforts, although they would facilitate an understanding of how the law has
developed.
  Important differences between courts and other social institutions, however, might keep the courts from adapting as
well to *64 cognitive illusions. First, courts might lack adequate pressure to improve the quality of their decision
making. [FN15]  Civil engineers who build faulty buildings will quickly find themselves without clients, but courts
are public resources that do not face true competitive pressures. [FN16]  Judges surely have some incentives to make
good law and avoid illusions of judgment, but they lack the incentives that other institutions face. [FN17]  Second,
courts rarely encounter feedback.  On issues of law, judges can usually count on a settlement, rather than an appeal,
[FN18] and on issues of fact, judges rarely learn the true state of affairs.  These impediments make it somewhat less
likely that courts would adapt to illusions of judgment than other social institutions.
  Unfortunately, courts do not follow a consistent pattern of either ignoring or adapting to illusions of judgment.
[FN19]  Courts both ignore and adapt to the same illusion in similar situations.  As discussed in Part I of this Article,
courts have developed numerous adaptations to an illusion of judgment known as the hindsight bias, but in cases
involving the law governing trusts, courts seem to have fallen victim to it.  Similarly, as described in Part II of this
Article, in some contexts courts have recognized and *65 adapted to illusions of judgment that arise from a cognitive
process known as the representativeness heuristic, while in other, similar contexts, the courts seem oblivious to it.
Scholarship applying cognitive psychology to law also reflects this problem.  Recent scholarship documenting new
applications of cognitive psychology to law contains blends of both positive implications and normative
prescriptions of cognitive illusions. [FN20]  For example, some scholars argue that cognitive illusions that lead
people to be too optimistic about their abilities to fulfill commitments can explain some legal doctrine, [FN21]
others contend that similar illusions support new legal reforms. [FN22]
  Closer inspection reveals a pattern of ignorance and adapta-tion in the courts.  As discussed in Part III, courts are
more likely to recognize the influence of cognitive biases in the types of cases that generally require trial by jury
than in cases that typically require trial by judge.  This distinction is consistent with an observation that cognitive
psychologists have made between insider versus outsider perspectives on cognitive illusions. [FN23]  Psychologists
argue that people can more easily identify cognitive biases when they treat a decision-making problem as one of a
class of similar problems that many other people face than when they treat it as a unique problem that they face
alone. [FN24]  As a consequence, cognitive biases are easier to spot in others than in *66 oneself. [FN25]
  As applied to the legal process, judges are more likely to adopt an outsider perspective to decision making by juries
than by themselves or other judges.  When judges both determine the procedural rules that govern fact- finding and
decide the facts themselves they are inside the decision-making task.  This insider perspective makes it difficult to
identify cognitive illusions that might affect judgment.  By contrast, a jury trial necessarily separates the fact-finding
process from the process of adopting procedural rules to govern fact-finding.  This creates an outsider perspective on
the decision-making process thereby making it easier for courts to identify cognitive illusions.
  Rather than a troublesome anomaly for the psychological analysis of law, the identification of a split between
adaptation to and ignorance of cognitive illusions illuminates a novel perspective on the legal system.  In addition to
the conventional arguments in defense of trial by jury, research in cognitive psychology suggests that the reliance on
juries facilitates the identification of erroneous fact-finding processes.
I Hindsight Bias and Legal Judgments
  People overestimate the predictability of past events: a phenomenon known as the hindsight bias. [FN26]  Among
the cognitive illusions of judgment that psychologists have studied, the hindsight bias is one of the most well-
documented and well-understood.  It is also quite intuitive, and its effects are relatively easy to identify.  Hence, it is
a good candidate for testing the theory that courts adapt to illusions of judgment.  In many contexts, the courts have
recognized and adapted to the influence that the bias has on judgment. [FN27]  In at least one circumstance,
however, in the *67 law governing liability of trustees, the courts have fallen prey to the bias.
A. The Hindsight Bias
  The originator of the work on the hindsight bias, psychologist Baruch Fischhoff, described it as follows:
    In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated in foresight.  They not only tend to
view what has happened as having been inevitable but also to view it as having appeared "relatively inevitable"
before it happened.  People believe that others should have been able to anticipate events much better than was
actually the case. [FN28]
  To demonstrate how the bias operates, Baruch Fischhoff presented undergraduate subjects with a brief account of
the circumstances leading up to a war between the British and the Nepalese Gurkhas in the early nineteenth century.
[FN29]  The account stated that the war had four possible outcomes: British victory, Gurkha victory, stalemate with
no peace treaty, or stalemate with a peace treaty.  Four groups of subjects were told that one of the four outcomes
had actually occurred.  The subjects were then asked to estimate the probability that they would have assigned to
each outcome had they not been told of the actual outcome.  A fifth group of subjects was asked to estimate the
probability of each of the four outcomes without having been provided with any outcome.  The results showed clear
evidence of a hindsight bias.  Subjects who were provided with an outcome rated it as having been more probable
than subjects who were not given an outcome and subjects who were given a different outcome. [FN30]
  Psychologists have conducted nearly 130 experiments demonstrating the existence of the hindsight bias using a
variety of different methods, materials, and subjects. [FN31]  Every published empirical test of the hindsight bias
replicates the phenomenon. [FN32]  *68 Procedures that ask people explicitly to estimate the response of others who
are not given an outcome and procedures in which people are asked to remember their own pre- event estimates for
likelihood of various outcomes both replicate Fischhoff's original findings. [FN33]  Furthermore, manipulations
designed to reduce the size of the effect such as paying people for accurate answers, telling people about the
existence of the hindsight bias, or having people construct elaborate analyses of the likelihoods of the various
outcomes do not eliminate the bias' influence on judgment. [FN34]  Even researchers who tend to be skeptical of the
existence of illusions of judgment have concluded that the hindsight bias is a robust phenomenon. [FN35]
  Psychologists have developed a widely accepted theory accounting for the hindsight bias. [FN36]  The bias results
primarily from the natural (and useful) tendency for the brain to incorporate known outcomes into existing
knowledge automatically, and to make further inferences from that knowledge. [FN37]  For example, subjects in the
British-Gurkha study who were told that the British had won probably made inferences about colonial warfare.
[FN38] They may have concluded, for example, that the advantages that the British had over the Gurkhas (better
weapons and training) were more important in such conflicts than the Gurkha advantages (better knowledge of the
terrain and greater motivation).  Subjects informed of a Gurkha victory may have inferred the opposite.  When asked
to estimate the probability of a British victory, the subjects relied on their new belief that better weapons and
training were more important than knowledge of the terrain and greater motivation.  These inferences then induced
the subjects *69 to make high estimates for the probability of the known outcome, relative to the estimates of people
who were unaware of the outcome and hence had not developed such beliefs. [FN39] Even if people can suppress
their knowledge of the outcome, they are not even aware that they have made these further inferences, and
consequently cannot suppress them.
  More generally, ignoring a known outcome is unnatural. [FN40]  Normally, people should integrate new
information into their existing store of knowledge and use it to make future predictions.  Assessing the predictability
of past events requires that both the outcome and the subsequent inferences that depend upon learning the outcome
be ignored.  Perhaps because such judgments are so uncommon and unnatural, people cannot make them accurately.
  Few decisions in ordinary life require an assessment of the predictability of past outcomes, but such assessments
are pervasive in legal contexts.  Whenever a court must determine what a party "should have known," it is
susceptible to the influence of the hindsight bias. [FN41]  Several studies have demonstrated that the bias influences
judgments of legal liability.  For example, one study compared the decisions made by subjects randomly assigned
either to decide in foresight whether a defendant should take a precaution against flooding, or to judge in hindsight
whether a decision not to take the same precaution was negligent. [FN42]  In foresight, the subjects listened to
evidence on the costs and benefits of the precaution. They learned that the precaution had an annual cost of
$100,000, but would completely eliminate any likelihood of a flood that would cause $1,000,000 in damage to a
nearby bakery.  Most of the evidence related to the probability that the flood would occur.  Subjects had to estimate
this probability in order to decide whether the precaution should be taken.  Subjects judging liability in hindsight
were told that the precaution had not been taken and that the $1,000,000 flood had occurred.  They then reviewed
the same evidence on the probability of the flood that the foresight subjects reviewed and decided whether the
precaution should have been taken.  In foresight, 76% of the subjects concluded that the flood was so *70 unlikely
that the precaution was unnecessary.  In hindsight, 57% of the subjects concluded that the flood was so likely that
the failure to take the precaution was negligent.  As a consequence of the hindsight bias, ex ante estimates of
appropriate care to be taken against causing harm are apt to appear unreasonable when judged ex post.  This result
has been replicated in three other studies. [FN43]
B. Courts Adapting Well to the Hindsight Bias
  The evidence that the hindsight bias influences judgments of liability might be taken as a suggestion that
determinations of liability in the courts are in need of reform.  Some scholars have, in fact, made this claim. [FN44]
Because the bias is quite intuitive and easily observable, however, courts might have already recognized and adapted
to its influence.
  The key to understanding how the legal system might respond to the hindsight bias is recognizing that there is no
effective strategy to induce a judge or jury to make an unbiased ex post assessment of the ex ante probability of an
adverse outcome.  No known decision-making strategy enables people to make decisions in hindsight that resemble
decisions made in foresight. [FN45] Psychologists have tried informing people about the bias, increasing their
motivation for accuracy, and having them conduct detailed analysis of alternative outcomes, all without much
success. [FN46]  The few researchers who have claimed to eliminate the bias have done so only by confusing
research subjects about which outcome actually occurred [FN47] or by asking a question in hindsight that does not
call for an ex ante estimate of the likelihood of the outcome. [FN48]  Learning an outcome causes people to *71
update their beliefs without even realizing it, making it impossible to restore, or even remember, the beliefs that they
held before they learned the outcome.
  Even if psychologists discover some mechanism for ameliorating the influence of the hindsight bias, it is likely to
be too intrusive to be suitable for a judicial proceeding.  Those methods that have proven partially effective at
debiasing require significant restructuring of the decision-making task.  For example, several researchers have
reduced the bias by having subjects provide detailed explanations for how alternative outcomes might have been
obtained, or by drawing out fault trees to document the ways in which alternative outcomes might have occurred.
[FN49]  Others have achieved some reduction in the magnitude of the bias by having subjects make detailed
assessments of the plausibility of the potential outcomes in foresight. [FN50]  These techniques are so foreign to the
kinds of procedures that judges and juries use to assess liability that they are not good candidates for ameliorating
the influence of the hindsight bias in the courts.
  The law does, of course, have a heavy-handed means of altering the outcome at trial, allocating the burden of
production and setting the standard of proof. These safeguards commonly operate against the party most likely to
benefit from the hindsight bias--the plaintiff. [FN51]  This observation has led some to advocate raising the standard
of proof to clear and convincing evidence in cases in which the plaintiff is likely to benefit from the hindsight bias.
[FN52]  The problem with such a blunt reform as adjusting the standard of proof is that it treats the symptom, not
the disease.  Such a reform might be inadequate, or might over-compensate for the bias' influence.
  This is not to say that courts are powerless to adapt to the hindsight bias.  Courts recognize that they will not be
able to obtain accurate ex post assessments of the ex ante probabilities of adverse outcomes and adjust the decision-
making process in one of two ways: they either suppress evidence that could not have been known beforehand or
they attempt to enforce an ex ante *72 standard. [FN53]
  The law includes several examples of efforts to suppress information that could not have been known beforehand.
For example, courts suppress evidence of subsequent remedial measures in accident cases, so as not to exacerbate
the influence of the hindsight bias. [FN54]  Also, courts refuse to allow suits to proceed when the only evidence of
negligence or fraud consists of a bad outcome. [FN55]  As a final example, in cases challenging the validity of a
patent on the grounds that the invention was "obvious," courts have recognized the potential influence of the
hindsight bias (once the innovation is developed, the insights that led to its creation become obvious).  Rather than
relying on an open-ended inquiry into whether an invention seemed obvious, the courts assess factors that are not
susceptible to the bias' influence, such as whether the innovation satisfied a long-felt unresolved need and enjoyed
immediate commercial success. [FN56]
  Courts also attempt to avoid relying on hindsight by identifying an ex  ante norm to apply.  For example, in tort
law, courts treat compliance with a custom or a safety regulation as evidence of non-negligence. [FN57]  In medical
malpractice cases, doctors cannot be held liable if the care they provided comported with prevailing medical custom.
[FN58]  Finally, in corporate law, officers and directors are not liable for negligent business decisions. [FN59]
Courts support these doctrines, in part, because of their concern with the *73 accuracy of liability determinations
conducted in hindsight. [FN60]
  Adaptation to the hindsight bias will not necessarily lead to more accurate decisions in the courtroom.  Courts
overreact to the influence of the bias. For example, suppressing subsequent remedial measures in accident cases
slightly reduces the pool of relevant evidence that the fact-finder has available to decide the case.  If the effect of the
hindsight bias is small, these adaptations might be overreactions to the problem of judging liability in hindsight.
[FN61]  Furthermore, the hindsight bias is only one of many cognitive limitations that affect the courtroom.
Adjusting only for the hindsight bias can unduly tilt the playing field, particularly as the bias tends to benefit
plaintiffs.  Along similar lines, identification of the role of hindsight might simply create a handy excuse for courts
to dismiss actions against disfavored plaintiffs, such as those bringing claims under the federal securities laws.
[FN62]
  Accurate assessments of the ex ante probabilities would clearly be superior to many of the remedies that courts
have pursued as responses to the hindsight bias.  Research on the bias, however, indicates that such assessments are
not available.  Remarkably, courts have avoided the temptations of simple responses (such as altering the standard of
proof) that would not really solve the problem.  Courts might be overreacting to the hindsight bias, but they at least
recognize the nature of the problems they face.  Without such recognition, courts would have no chance of
responding to the underlying consequences of cognitive illusions.
C. Courts Falling Prey To the Hindsight Bias
  Courts do not uniformly adapt to the hindsight bias, however.  As discussed below, the law governing the liability
of trustees for improperly investing trust assets is best described as an instance of courts falling prey to the hindsight
bias.
  The law governing investment of a trust's assets implicates the hindsight bias.  If an investment turns out badly, and
the benefi-ciary sues, the trustee's investment decisions will seem impru-dent, maybe even negligent, in hindsight.
[FN63]  As a result, trustees *74 are at the same risk for being judged too harshly as ordinary tort defendants and
corporate officers. As Professor Scott, the reporter for both the first and second Restatements of Trusts, described
the problem: "It is difficult . . . for a judge . . . to disregard the lesson taught by subsequent events and to put himself
in the position in which the trustee was when he acted." [FN64]
  If courts have adapted to the hindsight bias in other contexts, then they should have adapted in trusts and estates
law as well.  The case law, however, suggests ignorance, not adaptation.
1. A Brief History of Trustee Liability for Imprudent Investments
  Contemporary American law governing trustee liability devel-oped first in England in the eighteenth century.  At
that time, English courts adopted the "legal-list" rule; no trustee could be liable for investing a trust's assets in a
legally prescribed category of investments. [FN65]  Purchasing investments not identified as legally safe would
result in a surcharge against the trustee if the investment lost money.  The list was quite short--it included only
government-issued bonds.  By the middle of the nineteenth century, courts added some select equities to the list (for
example, stock in the East India Company), but the rule was always an exceptionally cautious one. [FN66]  As a
consequence, trustees tended to invest only in a limited set of low-risk, low-yield securities. [FN67]
  Nineteenth-century American courts initially borrowed from England and followed the legal-list doctrine, but a
new rule emerged in the United States. In 1830, in Harvard College v. Amory, [FN68] the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts abandoned the wooden "legal-list" rule in favor of a more flexible, *75 "prudent-investor" standard.
The court held that, in deciding how to invest the corpus of a trust, trustees were "to observe how men of prudence,
discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation but in regard to the permanent
disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be
invested." [FN69]  According to the court, the law should not restrict a trustee to purchasing a limited range of
legally prescribed investments for a trust.  Trustees should be free to follow the best investment practices of the time
and should be liable only for purchasing an investment that a "prudent" investor would have avoided.  The prudent-
investor rule adopted in the Amory case promised flexibility by encouraging trustees to treat the trust's assets the
same way they would treat their own assets.  Presumably, as prudent- investment strategies improved over time, so
too would the investment strategies required by a court following the prudent-investor rule.
  The prudent-investor rule had the potential to ameliorate two distinct disadvantages of the legal-list rule.  First, the
approved investments consisted largely of government bonds that provided no protection against the risk of
inflation. [FN70]  Second, the rate of return on these investments was historically much lower than that of a diverse
array of securities. [FN71]  The prudent-investor rule promised to encourage trustees to take advantage of
developments in finance theory that produce improved investment strategies that avoided the defects in the
investments identified by the legal- list rule.
  Despite the apparent advantages of the prudent-investor rule, courts were slow to adopt it. [FN72]  Most states
retained some version of the legal-list rule until the Great Depression revealed that even government lands entailed
some economic risks. [FN73]  This revelation inspired most state legislatures to reform their trust law to adopt the
prudent-investor rule.
  The potential for flexibility that the prudent-investor rule *76 promised, however, was never quite realized.  Courts
applying the prudent-investor rule became more concerned with the "probable safety" than the "probable income" of
investments.  Consequently, courts repeatedly condemned trustees for purchasing "speculative" investments such as
shares of stock bought on margin, "bonds selling at a large discount because of uncertainty as to whether they will
be paid at maturity," junior mortgages, and real estate. [FN74] Despite the fact that many prudent investors include
securities such as these in a well-diversified portfolio, courts repeatedly held trustees liable for losses that arose from
investing in these forms of high-risk (but high-yield) investments.
  Judicial concern with high-risk, high-yield investments would be appropriate if the trustee had also failed to
diversify the risks of these investments. The case law, however, includes several instances in which courts held
trustees accountable for the poor performance of specific investments in a diversified portfolio. [FN75]  Citing cases
like these, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts and influential treatises condemned these investments, holding them
to be per se speculative. [FN76]  The courts thus converted a potentially flexible "prudent-investor" rule into a
"constrained-prudent-investor" rule. [FN77]  The constrained rule that developed wasessentially identical to the
legal-list rule--trustees were immune from liability for a narrow class of investments and were essentially insurers of
good performance for the rest.
  A few jurisdictions, while embracing this constrained rule, also asserted that the prudent-investor rule was one of
conduct, not outcome. [FN78]  A trustee who appeared to be taking reasonable care by carefully monitoring
investments and seeking out investment advice would not be liable if an investment performed poorly.  Courts in
these jurisdictions held that the prudent-investor rule was one of "conduct rather than performance." [FN79] Even in
such jurisdictions, however, investing in the proscribed categories of *77 securities could result in liability,
regardless of the level of care exercised by the trustee. [FN80]
  Intense criticism accompanied the development of the constrained-prudent- investor rule. [FN81]  Armed with the
same understanding of modern portfolio theory that drove trustees to purchase some high-risk, high-yield
investments, academics ridiculed the courts' applications of the prudent-investor rule. [FN82]  In response to the
undesirable consequences of the rule, the American Law Institute produced a new Restatement in 1992, [FN83]
along with a Uniform Prudent Investor Act ("UPIA").  The new Restatement and UPIA incorporate modern notions
of investment, replacing admonitions against speculation with a requirement that the trustee invest for "risk and
return objectives reasonably suited to the trust." [FN84]  Combined with an affirmative duty to diversify, this new
doctrine is designed to restrain courts from singling out individual investments in a portfolio that have performed
poorly without assessing the role that these investments played in the portfolio's diversification scheme.  Several
states quickly adopted the UPIA. [FN85]  How the judiciary ultimately responds to the new rule remains to be seen.
2. The History of Trustee Liability as an Adaption to the Hindsight Bias
  Two major improvements in financial investment theory obviously explain much of the developments in trust law.
The creation, in the nineteenth century, of relatively stable investment vehicles by governments and large
corporations made the legal-list rule possible.  The development, in the twentieth century, of modern portfolio
theory, with its lessons for reducing the risk of high-yield investments through diversification, made long-term
investment of larger trusts exclusively in government securities foolish.  At two points in the history of trustee
liability, courts clung to bright-line tests that impeded the use of these economic innovations.  Although settlors and
trustees could always contract out of the anachronistic rules, doing so would have been *78 costly.  In both cases,
legislative reforms were necessary to purge the courts of their reliance on outdated analysis.
  The aversion to the flexible prudent-investor rule arguably reflects concern with relying on judgments in hindsight
as a basis for liability.  Because of the hindsight bias, an investment that seems prudent in foresight will often seem
imprudent in hindsight, thereby resulting in liability under the prudent- investor rule.  Consequently, like other
negligence standards, the prudent- investor rule creates incentives for trustees to be too cautious with the trust's
assets. [FN86]  The logical adaptation to the influence of the hindsight bias is a bright-line rule. [FN87]  A list of
easily identifiable investments that are eitherper se legal or per se illegal would avoid the influence of the hindsight
bias.  Inducing trustees into investing in a limited portfolio of low-risk, low-yield investments is a costly solution to
the problem of judging in hindsight.  This solution, however, might be less expensive than holding trustees to a de
facto strict liability standard. [FN88]
  A process-oriented version of the prudent-investor rule, in which liability turns on whether the trustee was
adequately informed before investing, could also reduce the influence of the hindsight bias.  The declaration by the
New York Courts, for example, that the prudent-investor rule is one of "conduct rather than performance" reflects
some recognition of the problem of judging liability in hindsight.  Such a rule could be similar to the business
judgment rule in corporate law, where the duty of corporate fiduciaries is merely to make well-informed (and
disinterested) decisions.  Applying a process-oriented rule to trustees could mitigate the effect of the hindsight bias
to some extent, although the outcome might influence courts' assessment of the adequacy of the process. [FN89]  In
fact, as applied, New York's version of the prudent-investor rule continued to create liability for trustees that might
be attributable to the hindsight bias.  This is unlike the business judgment rule, which operates as a blanket *79
protection against liability for negligence.  Consequently, even the process-based rule constrained the investments
that trustees were willing to undertake. [FN90]
  In sum, the development of bright-line and process-based rules of liability for trustees could reflect a judicial
attempt to cope with the problem of determining negligence in hindsight.  These rules are costly adaptations.  The
bright-line rules make diversification more expensive, thereby reducing the returns on investments that trustees
make.  The process- based rules create an excess of incentives for trustees to create an elaborate paper trail to
demonstrate that they have satisfied the procedural requirements of the rule and apparently do not eliminate the
influence of the hindsight bias. [FN91]  Nevertheless, these adaptations might be less troublesome than applying a
straightforward negligence rule influenced by the hindsight bias. Although the courts might look foolish to
commentators who are unaware of the influence of the hindsight bias, the courts might be doing the best that they
can in a world where assessments of negligence are necessarily biased.
3. The Real Story: Courts Falling Prey to the Hindsight Bias
  Closer scrutiny of the case law, however, suggests that courts judging the liability of trustees have not cleverly
adapted to the hindsight bias, but have fallen prey to its influence.  The legal-list rule of the nineteenth-century can
be described as an effort to draw a bright line in order to avoid relying on judgments in hindsight, but the
constrained-prudent-investor rule cannot. The constraints developed as the courts assessed the prudence of trustees
in cases in which investments produced worse than expected results.  In these cases, courts consistently failed to
appreciate the problems associated with judging in hindsight.  They conducted post hoc searches for evidence that
investments were too risky.  For example, in Chase v. Pevear, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld
the lower court's surcharge of a trustee for two investments, constituting less than four percent of a large and diverse
portfolio, because these two companies included some "disquieting information" in their prospectuses. [FN92]  The
courts also acted as if trustees were nearly omniscient.  For *80 example, in First Alabama Bank v. Martin, the
Alabama Supreme Court held that a group of five high-risk, high-yield equities were speculative, as evidenced by
the fact that the trustee had lost money on them by selling "at the bottom of the market." [FN93]  The court assumed
that the trustee knew that the price of the equities was "recovering," and hence the trustee should not have sold them.
Similarly, a California Appellate Court held a trustee liable for investing in a second mortgage on a property after
the owner defaulted because the trustee had "left an inadequate margin of security." [FN94]  The court failed to
address the issue of how the trustee could have known whether the margin was inadequate.  One court even held a
trustee liable for failing to foresee the stock market crash of 1929. [FN95]  The pattern in cases of trustee liability,
even in contemporary cases, has been to use evidence of an adverse outcome as the basis for scrutinizing individual
investments in a portfolio, and then labeling investments that performed poorly as speculative. [FN96]
  As a consequence of their reliance on hindsight, courts continuously declared investments of certain types to be
speculative. [FN97]  Because of the hindsight bias, any investment with the potential to lose money could have
given rise to liability; the riskier the investment, the more likely that it would result in liability.  Consequently, the
prudent-investor rule evolved from a flexible standard of liability into a source of constraints on trustees developed
by adjudication in hindsight. [FN98]
  Had the courts understood that they were unable to judge the liability of investors in hindsight properly, they would
have understood the failings of the bright-line rule that they were developing *81 by accident.  When portfolio
management came into its own in the late 1960's, any court that recognized the problem of judging in hindsight
would have realized that there were some tradeoffs to be made.  A bright-line rule avoids the problem of judging in
hindsight, but makes it difficult for trustees to follow a strategy of diversification.  This recognition would have
enabled the courts to take stock of this tradeoff and possibly adopt a procedural standard.  As noted above, the
procedural standard might reflect a good compromise.  Indeed, a minority of states (although notably, New York
was among them) attempted to develop a process-based liability rule. [FN99]  For the most part, however, courts fell
prey to the bias and developed doctrine that would delay the application of modern portfolio theory into the law of
trusts by about three decades. [FN100]
  Explanations other than judicial susceptibility to the hindsight bias could account for the results of these cases.  The
investment strategies of the trustees in these cases are somewhat unusual.  In both Chase v. Pevear [FN101] and
First Alabama Bank v. Martin, [FN102] the trustees had purchased a diverse, but somewhat idiosyncratic selection
of securities. Likewise, in In re Estate of Collins, [FN103] it is unclear why the trustee would have chosen that
particular second mortgage as an investment vehicle.  It is unclear why the trustees in these cases purchased these
idiosyncratic investments rather than a sensible combination of mutual funds.  It might be that these courts suspected
some sort of self-dealing that they could not identify, or simply felt that the investment strategies were too bizarre to
support, wholly apart from their poor performance.  Nevertheless, these courts easily lapsed into the language of
judging in hindsight, thereby driving other trustees into overly cautious investment strategies.
II Representativeness and Legal Judgments
  Another cognitive phenomenon known as the representative-ness heuristic also has the potential to influence
judgments made *82 in the courts. [FN104] The representativeness heuristic refers to the reliance on the degree of
apparent similarity between the features of the events to the features of the category in judging whether an event is a
member of a particular category. [FN105]  Because judges and juries must determine whether a set of events fits
into a particular category, they likely rely heavily on the representativeness heuristic.  Like the hindsight bias, in
some circumstances, courts have identified this phenomenon and made some corrections for it and, in other
circumstances, courts have fallen prey to its undesirable consequences.
A. The Representativeness Heuristic
  People frequently must determine whether an event is the product of a particular process or is a member of a
certain category of events.  For example, in determining whether to provide a student with a favorable letter of
recommendation for a judicial clerkship, a law professor might have to judge whether a high-quality writing sample
from the student indicates that she is capable of first-rate legal research and scholarship.  Similarly, jurors must
determine whether a defendant's nervous demeanor evinces a guilty conscience. Such judgments have been widely
studied by psychologists. [FN106]  These studies reveal that people make categorical judgments primarily by
assessing the degree to which the event resembles the category.  When the event is similar to the category, people
judge the likelihood that the event is a member of that category as high; when the event is not similar to the
category, people judge the likelihood that the event is a member of that category as low. Psychologists refer to this
decision-making strategy as the representativeness heuristic. [FN107]
  The representativeness heuristic can be a wonderfully accurate rule of thumb.  Often, a high-quality writing sample
provides *83 good evidence that a student would make a fine judicial clerk.  Problems arise because people tend to
rely on the representativeness heuristic to the exclusion of other information relevant to categorical judgments.
[FN108]  For example, reliance on the representativeness heuristic leads people to discount the importance of a
category's prevalence (often referred to as the "base rate"). [FN109]
  To demonstrate the tendency for people to ignore base rates, Tversky and Kahneman gave subjects a description of
an individual and asked them to estimate the likelihood that the person identified by the description was either a
lawyer or an engineer. [FN110]  They also informed the subjects that the person was randomly selected from a
group of one hundred individuals who were all either lawyers or engineers, and they provided the subjects with the
proportion of lawyers and engineers in the sample.  Although the subjects' estimates were quite sensitive to the
description, they were relatively insensitive to the proportion of lawyers and engineers in the population.  When
informed, for example, that the target person was married with no children, was of high ability and motivation,
promised to be successful in his field, and was well liked by his colleagues, subjects reported that the likelihood that
this person was a lawyer was 50%, regardless of whether the stated proportion of lawyers in the population was 70%
or 30%.  The subjects paid close attention to this vague information about the target person and discounted the
importance of highly relevant statistical information.
  Even professional decision makers underrate the importance of background statistics.  For example, one study
showed that medical doctors chronically misinterpret the meaning of medical tests designed to detect rare diseases.
[FN111]  To see how this might occur, consider the following hypothetical. [FN112]  Suppose that a patient
manifests symptoms that lead a doctor to suspect that the patient might have a rare disease.  One in one hundred
patients with these symptoms actually has the disease.  The doctor *84 administers a test that is 90% accurate (and
the accuracy does not depend upon whether the patient actually has the disease or not).  Doctors tend to believe that
patients who test positive for the disease are highly likely to have the disease. [FN113]  In fact, under these
conditions, the patient is unlikely to have the disease, as described in the tables below.
Table 1: Rare Disease Problem
                        Test Result      Total
                     Positive  Negative
Actual     Positive       0.9       0.1    1.0
Condition  Negative       9.9      89.1   99.0
Total                    10.8      89.2  100.0
  
  Because one percent of patients with the symptoms actually have the disease, and patients with the disease are 90%
likely to test positive, the probability that any given patient tests positive and has the disease is 0.9%.  (The
probability that the patient has the disease and tests negative is 0.1%).  Because 99% of patients with the symptoms
do not have the disease, and patients without the disease are 10% likely to test positive, the probability that the
patient does not have the disease and tests positive is 9.9%.  (The probability that the patient does not have the
disease and tests negative is 89.1%).  As a result, the probability that a patient who tests positive actually has the
disease is 0.9 divided by 10.8, or only 8.3%.
  In the rare disease problem, the doctors discounted the importance of the base rate of the illness in the relevant
patient population. [FN114] Instead of engaging in a normatively appropriate Bayesian process [FN115] of updating
their pre-test beliefs about the patients in light of the new test results, they committed what can be called the
"inverse fallacy." [FN116] That is, they confused the probability of the evidence given the hypothesis with the
probability of the hypothesis given the evidence.  The reliability *85 of the medical test (90%) is the probability of
the evidence (a positive result) given the hypothesis (the patient has the illness).  Although this error could be
ascribed to confusion about what was meant by "90% accurate," or ignorance of probability theory, the inverse
fallacy is precisely the kind of mistake that reliance on the representativeness heuristic would produce. [FN117]
The heuristic leads people to believe that the positive outcome of the test is conclusive and the base rate statistics are
not. [FN118]
  Excessive reliance on the representativeness heuristic leads to an array of other similar problems in evaluating
evidence.  People make categorical predictions that are insensitive to the reliability of the evidence supporting their
predictions, misunderstand what a random sequence of events looks like, and fail to appreciate common statistical
phenomena like regression to the mean. [FN119]  In short, people assume that if a bird looks like a duck, quacks like
a duck, and walks like a duck, it's a duck.  This is a good heuristic on the whole, but it leads people to ignore the
proportion of geese in the population that the alleged duck has been drawn from, the reliability of the observations
about the alleged duck, and how the alleged duck was selected from the group of wildfowl.  Folk aphorisms have
developed in some fields to remind people of the need to attend to base-rate statistics.  For example, doctors are
admonished, "when you hear hoof beats, don't think zebras."  Such aphorisms confirm the need for some adaptation
to counteract people's tendency to discount the importance of base rate statistics.
B. Adapting to the Representativeness Heuristic: Forensic Evidence
  An excessive reliance on the representativeness heuristic can easily lead judges and juries to misinterpret the
implications of forensic evidence. For example, finding carpet fibers at a crime scene that match fibers found in a
criminal defendant's home can seem like damning evidence of guilt.  To assess such evidence *86 properly, a fact-
finder must also attend to the prevalence of the type of carpet fibers.  If 90% percent of all carpet fibers would match
each other in the test used by the forensic expert, then such evidence is of little value.  Reliance on the
representative-ness heuristic suggests that people will tend to downplay the importance of the probability of a
random match.  Furthermore, the heuristic can lead a fact-finder to disregard other characteristics of the evidence
that undermine its probative value, such as the probability of laboratory error or other mismanagement of the
evidence.
  Forensic evidence that is explicitly probabilistic can easily lead decision makers to commit the inverse fallacy.
[FN120]  As an example, suppose forensic evidence in a criminal case reveals that the perpetrator had a relatively
rare blood type that is found only in one in twenty adults.  Suppose further that the defendant also has the same
blood type as the perpetrator. Committing the inverse fallacy here would lead a decision maker to infer that there is a
only one in twenty chance that the defendant is innocent. [FN121]  Such an inference confuses the probability that
the defendant is innocent given the matching blood type with the probability of the matching blood type given an
innocent defendant (which is actually one in twenty). Determining the probability that the defendant is innocent
given the matching blood type requires knowing the probability that the defendant is innocent in the absence of a
blood test, which might be inferred from a base-rate statistic. [FN122]
1. Forensic Evidence: Adaptation
  Several features of the trial process counteract the tendency to *87 commit the inverse fallacy and induce decision
makers to pay closer attention to background characteristics of forensic evi-dence.  First, forensic evidence is subject
to cross-examination and presentation of counter-arguments by a defense attorney.  Unlike many cognitive biases,
the inverse fallacy can be avoided by describing its operation to decision makers. [FN123]  Thus, even though a
prosecutor would want to induce a decision maker to commit the inverse fallacy, a reasoned cross-examination of
the forensic expert presenting the evidence will bring out the true probative value of the testimony.  To use the
example of the match of a rare blood type, a defense attorney can easily point out that thousands of other people in
the relevant population also share the rare blood type.  In fact, some commentators have worried that defense
attorneys can use the probabilistic nature of forensic testimony to induce juries to ignore forensic testimony
altogether. [FN124]
  Courts also require careful documentation of background factors such as the chain of custody of forensic evidence.
[FN125]  This focuses attention on those factors that the representativeness heuristic might otherwise lead people to
disregard.  These rules also enable defense attorneys to explore the possibility of laboratory error or other
background factors that may affect the probative value of the evidence.  Even if the decision maker is susceptible to
the inverse fallacy, the adversarial process and the rules involving forensic evidence facilitate a countervailing
influence on the decision maker.
  The problem of the inverse fallacy is most acute in the context of DNA evidence.  In principle, even though DNA
evidence is sometimes referred to as "DNA fingerprinting," it does not differ from other probabilistic forensic
evidence like blood type. [FN126]  DNA matching consists of comparing small segments of a DNA sample from the
perpetrator with the same segments of a DNA sample from the suspect.  Many people share the same DNA *88
profile at a particular segment, just as many people share the same blood type.  Because a DNA lab can examine
multiple segments, however, they can generate a much more precise match than would be the case for a blood type.
Thus, whereas for blood type, the likelihood of a random match can range from one in four to one in one hundred, it
is common for the likelihood of a random DNA match to range from one in one million to one in one billion.
[FN127]  As a consequence, a decision maker who commits the inverse fallacy in the case of a DNA match will be
nearly confident of the defendant's guilt.
  In evaluating the admissibility of DNA evidence, courts have expressed concern with the impact of DNA evidence
on juries.  Some courts have treated such evidence in the same way that they treat other forensic evidence, and
allowed full introduction of such evidence and cross-examination, but others have worried that DNA evidence has
too much potential for abuse, and excluded it. [FN128]  Occasionally courts have allowed the fact of a DNA match
to be admitted, but disallowed any reference to the likelihood of a random match. [FN129]  In all cases, the courts
have expressed the concern that the fact- finder will give too much weight to the fact of a DNA match.  The current
trend favors full admissibility of DNA evidence, but courts that have changed from excluding to allowing this
testimony have done so only after deciding that the technique's reliability has improved so much that its probative
value outweighs the potential for misinterpretation by the fact-finder. [FN130]
  Judicial treatment of DNA evidence can be (and has been) criticized.  Scholars have argued that those courts that
have excluded DNA evidence have done so because of an unjustified (or empirically unsupported) assertion that
juries will overreact to this evidence. [FN131]  Even if this is true, courts are focused on the right issue:
overweighing the value of a DNA match. The representativeness heuristic predicts that juries will attend too closely
*89 to the fact of a forensic match and pay comparatively less attention to base-rate statistics, which is precisely the
concern that courts have expressed.  The disparate judicial treatment of DNA evidence has resulted because the
courts vary in the degree of concern that they express for the tendency of decision makers to overweigh the fact of a
match.  As with other forensic evidence, courts seem aware of the problem of the representativeness heuristic and
have adopted procedures that respond to it.
  Clearly, in some instances the courts have overreacted to the problem of representativeness in evaluating DNA
evidence.  Allowing the admission of the fact of a DNA match but not the probability of a random match is a foolish
adaptation.  More generally, in the case of DNA evidence, courts failed to consider the possibility that juries simply
distrust novel scientific evidence and actually under-weigh DNA evidence. [FN132]  As with the hindsight bias, the
adaptation might be worse than the problem.  Nevertheless, without some recognition of the biases that might
influence judgment in the courtroom, courts would be structuring rules under the naive hope that biases cancel each
other out.
2. Forensic Evidence: Ignorance
  Evidence of judicial ignorance of statistical principles and reliance on the representativeness heuristic can also be
found. [FN133]  In cases involving child sexual abuse, courts consider the presence of certain factors to constitute
probative evidence that a child was sexually abused as long as a medical doctor indicates that these factors are
"consistent with" child sexual abuse. [FN134]  Doctors looking for a diagnosis search actively for factors that are
"inconsistent with" disorders or conditions, as an accurate means of ruling such conditions out as a possible
diagnosis.  Assuming that "consistent with" means the same thing as "probative of," however, is essentially
committing the inverse fallacy.  In many cases, the presence of factors that are consistent with child sexual abuse are
also common among children who are not victims of sexual abuse. [FN135]  Rather than attending to base-rate and
background statistics, courts are looking for characteristics in children that *90 match those characteristics of
children who are sexually abused.  In effect, courts rely on the representativeness heuristic to determine whether
such evidence has probative value.
  As is the case with all forensic evidence, effective cross-examination could highlight the statistical aspects of the
evidence, thereby mitigating the effects of the representativeness heuristic.  The error that judges make, however, is
that they apply the wrong test for admissibility; they treat the term "consistent with" as being identical to "probative
of."  Consequently, the error that judges make is not in the weight that they give to the evidence, but that they give it
any weight at all.
C. Falling Prey to the Representativeness Heuristic: Res Ipsa Loquitur
  Similarly, the development of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur suggests that courts fall prey to the inverse fallacy.
As it is ordinarily stated, res ipsa loquitur represents a profound misunderstanding of the laws of probability in
precisely the way that the representativeness heuristic predicts.  Rather than recognizing and adapting to the bias,
most courts have fallen victim to its influence.
  In most of the usual forms in which it is presented, as Professor David Kaye has argued, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is badly flawed. [FN136]  According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, when judging liability for an
event that resulted in injury to a plaintiff, a fact-finder may infer that the defendant was negligent if "the event is of a
kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence." [FN137]  It is not entirely clear what the phrase
"ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence" means precisely.  It has commonly been restated as an
assertion that the probability of injury, given the exercise of reasonable care, is small, or at least smaller than the
probability of injury given negligence. [FN138]  In most cases that embrace the doctrine, the facts can support either
of these assertions. [FN139]  Without information on the base rate of negligence, however, neither assertion
supports the *91 conclusion that the defendant was more likely than not to be negligent.
  To see why, consider an example, which replicates the rare disease problem described earlier.  Suppose that a
plaintiff is an innocent bystander who is injured when a barrel of flour falls on him.  The defendant, a flour
merchant, had employees lowering barrels of flour from his facility at the time of the accident, but there is no other
proof of negligence on the defendant's part. [FN140]  It is not difficult to believe that barrels normally do not fall on
bystanders when people take reasonable care, or even that such accidents are far less likely to occur when the
defendant is careful than when the defendant is negligent.  Nevertheless, these observations cannot, by themselves,
support the conclusion that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care.  Suppose that the probability of an
injury given negligence is 10% and the probability of an injury given reasonable care is 1%.  This would easily
satisfy the traditional test for res ipsa loquitur, as described above.  Further suppose that negligence is rare, and only
occurs 1% of the time.  Under these circumstances, the defendant is almost certainly not negligent.
  Table 2, below, describes the conditional probabilities of the four possible outcomes, given the facts.  Because the
defendant is negligent 1% of the time and is 10% likely to cause an injury when negligent, the probability that on
any given occasion a victim is injured by the defendant's negligence is 0.1% (and the probability that the defendant
is negligent, but causes no injury is 0.9%).  Because the defendant is not negligent 99% of the time and is 1% likely
to cause an injury when not negligent, the probability that on any given occasion a victim is injured even though the
defendant took reasonable care is 0.99% (and the probability that the defendant is not negligent and causes no injury
is 98.01%).  As a result, the conditional probability that the defendant is negligent, given that the plaintiff is injured,
is 0.10 divided by 1.09, or 9.2%. [FN141]
Table 2: Res Ipsa Loquitur Problem
                                Event        Total
                          Injury  No Injury
Actual       Negligent      0.10       0.90    1.0
Condition  Not Negligent    0.99      98.01   99.0
Total                       1.09      98.91  100.0
  
  Without incorporating the background rate of negligence into the calculation, the observation that barrels do not
normally fall onto bystanders when reasonable care is exercised cannot *92 constitute sufficient evidence of
negligence by itself.  The base rate of negligence is essential to evaluating the likelihood that the defendant was
actually negligent.
  The apparent inability of courts to formulate a proper interpretation of res ipsa loquitur can be attributed to a poor
understanding of probability theory by the judiciary.  Even so, ignorance of probability theory does not predict what
kind of mistakes in probabilistic reasoning judges are apt to make. Relying on the representativeness heuristic leads
precisely to the kind of mistakes that courts have made in formulating the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.  Courts that
review cases of barrels falling on bystanders, sponges left inside of surgical patients, and airplanes lost at sea seem
to have relied on this heuristic to develop legal doctrine.  A barrel falling on a bystander closely resembles other
incidents of neglience.  This similarity leads courts to infer that negligence caused the barrel accident.  In making
this inference courts neglect the relevance of the base rate of negligence.
  The development of res ipsa loquitur arose from concerns other than just conditional probabilities. [FN142]  Early
courts might have been concerned about the ability of plaintiffs to obtain access to evidence needed to prove their
case, although modern discovery rules reduce the importance of this concern.  Also, the courts in these cases might
simply have felt that the defendants would be better able, under the circumstances, to bear the risk of injury.  The
formulation that these courts relied upon, however, provides no guarantee that the defendants are good insurers in
such cases.
  It might be that the courts simply failed to state clearly what they meant.  In fact, a current draft of the American
Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of Torts has adopted a new and accurate *93 formulation of the doctrine.
[FN143]  It asserts that a fact-finder may infer that the defendant was negligent when the cause of the plaintiff's
damages is "a type of accident that usually happens because of the negligence of one of the class of actors to which
the defendant belongs." [FN144]  This formulation targets the appropriate conditional probability--that of the
likelihood of negligence given the accident.  The formulations in Byrne v. Boadle [FN145] and the earlier
Restatements mistakenly relied on the probability of non-negligence given the accident.  The new formulation might
well be what the judges in earlier cases had in mind, but failed to articulate properly.  This failure is of a type that
the representativeness heuristic predicts that people will be prone to make, thereby suggesting that the heuristic has
played a role in the development of the law.
III Ignorance or Adaptation?
  The inconsistent judicial response to cognitive illusions presents a problem for the application of psychology to
law.  This inconsistency suggests that other considerations swamp psychological influences on the development of
the common law.  Closer analysis, however, reveals a pattern: courts tend to identify and adapt to the influence of
cognitive illusions on the determination of issues that juries are likely to resolve and ignore or fall prey to the
influence of cognitive illusions on the determination of issues that judges are likely to resolve.  Judges are more
likely to identify errors of judgment that the jury might commit than those that they would commit themselves.  This
pattern is consistent with the observation that taking an "outsider" perspective on a decision-making problem
reduces the influence of cognitive illusions. [FN146]
A. Identifying Cognitive Illusions: Trial by Judge Versus Jury
  The pattern of identifying the influence of cognitive illusions on jury decision making and not judicial decision
making occurs with both of the cognitive phenomena discussed in this paper: the hindsight bias and the
representativeness heuristic.
*94 1. Hindsight Bias: Judge Versus Jury
  Courts take note of the influence of the hindsight bias in cases that involve jury trials.  In tort actions, courts always
judge in hindsight, but seem to understand the problems associated with doing so.  Courts suppress information that
could not have been known beforehand, such as subsequent remedial measures, and allow defendants to use their
reliance on ex ante standards of conduct as defenses. [FN147]  In fact, in medical-malpractice cases, compliance
with custom is a complete shield to liability. [FN148]  In areas of law as diverse as patents and securities fraud,
judicial opinions and judicial rulings reflect a concern with judging in hindsight. [FN149] Although some types of
these cases, particularly those concerning patents, can be equitable actions in which the issues are resolved by
judges, the courts know that they must adopt rules that are sometimes implemented by juries.  In those types of cases
that frequently require jury trials, the courts worry about the problem of determining liability in hindsight.
  Suits brought by beneficiaries against trustees, however, are invariably actions brought in equity, not law. [FN150]
Consequently, these cases cannot be jury trials.  Under these circumstances, recognizing that the hindsight bias
influences how a fact-finder interprets the facts and making some adjustment requires that judges acknowledge that
the bias influences their decision making.  This puts the judge squarely inside the decision-making problem, making
it hard to identify the influence of a cognitive illusion.  The difficulty of identifying one's own susceptibility to
cognitive illusions might explain why courts in trusts cases are so vulnerable to the hindsight bias.
  The development of the business judgment rule in corporate law presents a problem for this explanation.  Under the
business judgment rule, officers and directors of corporations are not liable to their shareholders for negligent
business decisions. [FN151]  Courts commonly justify this doctrine on the grounds that judging *95 business
decisions in hindsight is necessarily biased. [FN152]  Judges recognize that even sound business decisions in
foresight can seem foolish in hindsight. [FN153]  In most jurisdictions, suits by shareholders against corporate
officers must be brought in equity, just like actions by beneficiaries against trustees.  Thus, the business judgment
rule was developed primarily for bench trials, arguably making it an example of courts identifying a cognitive
illusion in judges.
  Unlike actions by beneficiaries against trustees, however, suits by shareholders against corporate officers are not
uniformly bench trials.  In the nineteenth century, as the doctrine developed, a few jurisdictions did not consider
such actions equitable in nature.  In fact, one of the earliest American cases adopting the business judgment rule was
an appeal from a jury trial. [FN154]  Furthermore, the business judgment rule is sometimes misapplied in ways that
suggest vulnerability to the influence of the hindsight bias.  The Delaware Supreme Court arguably fell prey to the
hindsight bias in holding the corporate board liable for a breach of their duty of care to the shareholders in Smith v.
Van Gorkum. [FN155]  The holding in the case was widely criticized, [FN156] and, ultimately, the Delaware
legislature acted to alter the court's application of the doctrine.  Thus, even though the development of the business
judgment rule looks like an example of courts adapting well to the hindsight bias in cases involving judges, the
occasional availability of jury trials aided development of the doctrine and, when juries are not available, courts are
still vulnerable to missteps.
  Thus, despite a few wrinkles, the distinction between judge and *96 jury trials maps onto the circumstances in
which courts adapt or fail to adapt to the hindsight bias.
2. The Representativeness Heuristic: Judge Versus Jury
  Likewise, even though cases involving res ipsa loquitur are commonly jury trials, the application of res ipsa
loquitur combines law making and fact- finding functions into one decision maker.  In deciding to apply res ipsa
loquitur, courts are essentially deciding that the facts mean that the defendant is more likely than not to be negligent.
Even though a jury might later decide that evidence the defendant provides rebuts this initial determination, the shift
in the burden of proof is the product of judicial fact-finding.
  By contrast, probabilistic forensic evidence is likely to be evaluated by a jury.  Judges might be more likely to
suspect that a jury will rely excessively on the representativeness heuristic than realize that they would do so
themselves.  The judicial assessment of forensic evidence in cases involving allegations of child sexual abuse
confirm the theory that judges do not readily spot biases in themselves.  Judges confuse "consistent with" and
"probative" in precisely the way the representativeness heuristic predicts.  Contrasting the child sexual abuse cases
with the history of admissibility of DNA evidence shows that judges worry about the way juries react to
probabilistic evidence, but express no concern with their own probabilistic reasoning skills.
3. Other Cognitive Phenomena: Framing and Anchoring
  Many cognitive processes other than the hindsight bias and the representativeness heuristic can produce errors of
judgment in the courts. [FN157]  These could also provide potential tests of the theory that courts identify
systematic sources of error in juries but not in judges.  Some cognitive processes, however, might have completely
escaped the notice of courts, regardless of the decision-making body.  Cognitive psychologists have identified
decision-making processes that are not as intuitive as the hindsight bias or the representativeness heuristic and might
have escaped judges' attention.
  For example, courts do not recognize and adapt to the cognitive *97  process known as "anchoring."  Anchoring
refers to the tendency, when making quantitative judgments for arbitrary numeric reference points, to influence
judgments. [FN158]  For example, in one study, psychologists Tversky and Kahneman asked subjects to estimate
the percentage of countries in the United Nations that are African, but only after first spinning a "wheel of fortune"
to provide an arbitrary starting point for the subjects' estimates.  The subjects were told that they would first be
asked to determine whether the percentage obtained from the wheel was accurate, and then asked to provide their
own estimates.  For half of the subjects, the wheel provided them with an anchor of 10% and the other half started
with 65%.  Subjects in the former group gave a median estimate of 25%, while subjects in the latter group gave a
median estimate of 45%. [FN159]
  Several studies document the effects that anchors have on determinations of damage awards in civil lawsuits.
[FN160]  These studies reveal that the amount that plaintiffs request in damages influence the determination of civil
damage awards.  This occurs even when the anchor is wholly absurd, such as asking for more than a billion dollars
in an individual personal-injury lawsuit. [FN161]  Likewise, statutory damage caps have a much more profound
effect on damage awards than merely truncating awards at the amount of the cap--they raise and lower the size of
awards, depending upon whether the cap is high or low, relative to the likely award. [FN162]  Recent data also
suggests that anchors influence judges as well. [FN163]
  *98 Despite these effects, courts have expressed no recognition of the effect of anchors in any kind of case.
[FN164]  Judges instruct juries that the damage requests by attorneys should be given no weight, but in light of the
evidence that meaningless, arbitrary anchors influence decision making, this instruction is unlikely to be of any
value.  Likewise, courts that have had to contend with statutory damage caps have largely failed to recognize that
these caps can influence awards. [FN165]  Even plaintiff's attorneys do not really understand the effects of anchors.
Many seem to realize that their requests will have an effect on juries, [FN166] but plaintiffs might carefully limit
their requests, so as not to seem greedy.  The truth, as one study put it, is that "the more you ask for, the more you
get." [FN167]  The subtleties of how anchors affect decision making might simply lie beyond the basic intuitions of
judges.  Consequently, they do not identify the bias either in themselves or in juries.
  Similarly, courts have failed to address the problem of psychological framing in a systematic way.  Framing refers
to the tendency to treat gains differently from losses. [FN168]  Because many choices that involve losses can easily
be recast as gains (and vice versa), this disparity can lead to arbitrariness in decision making.  For example, doctors
and patients make different choices about medical treatments depending upon whether the risks associated with
treatment are described as likelihood of dying or likelihood of surviving. [FN169]  A review of a variety of areas of
law reveals that courts also treat gains and losses very differently. [FN170]  These differences can be arbitrary.  For
example, courts generally refuse to enforce contractual terms providing specific penalties for nonperformance *99 of
a contract, but are willing to enforce bonuses for on-time performance. [FN171]  In the jury context, courts do not
believe that attorney requests to the jury to measure pain and suffering damages as the amount the plaintiff would be
willing to pay (gains frame) as being any different from the amount that the plaintiff would be willing to accept (loss
frame), even though the two produce stunningly different results.
  Like anchoring, framing seems to lie beyond the ability of courts to identify, regardless of whether the issue
involves a judge or a jury.  Framing is difficult to grasp intuitively, and studies show that subjects shown two
problems that are identical except for a restructuring of the frame often see the problems as different. [FN172]
Understanding the influence of framing requires that people understand how a problem can easily be recast as a gain
or as a loss and then understand that the problem would feel different if recast.
  In sum, there are cognitive biases that operate outside the ability of courts to identify altogether.  As is the case
with representativeness and the hindsight bias, however, some biases can be identified, but the identification seems
to occur only in cases likely to involve jury trials.
B. Outsider Versus Insider Perspectives in the Courts
  Courts identify cognitive illusions that might affect juries and adapt to them, but fail to identify cognitive illusions
that affect judges and fall prey to them.  This account of the circumstances that lead courts to identify illusions of
judgment has an intuitive appeal and empirical support. Intuitively, it might be easier to spot illusions that affect
someone else than affect oneself.  Although psychologists have not collected much data that directly tests this
theory, what data there is supports it. [FN173]  Also, there is some indirect evidence with respect to the hindsight
bias.  The bias cannot be eliminated by warning people about the influence of the bias; when warned about its
effects, people quickly agree that others are susceptible to its effects, but believe that they themselves have made
internal corrections. [FN174]
  *100 The theory that jury trials facilitate recognition of cognitive illusions is consistent with the distinction that
cognitive psychologists have made between insider and outsider perspectives on decision making.  When a person
fails to see that a problem is one of a type of problem, they treat the problem as unique, leaving them vulnerable to
cognitive illusions.  Psychologists refer to this as being inside the problem.  Inside the problem, irrelevant details
take on greater importance and lead people astray.  For example, in the analysis of forensic evidence, people taking
an insider view might argue that the probability that any defendant with a certain set of characteristics is guilty is
irrelevant, because they want to know the probability that this particular defendant is guilty.  This inside perspective
leads people to rely on their feelings as to whether the defendant is guilty: feelings that might be the erroneous
products of over-reliance on the representativeness heuristic.  Someone who views this decision as one of a class of
decisions, however, would see the relevance of the statistical evidence and be more inclined to give it appropriate
weight. [FN175]
  The distinction between insider and outsider perspectives also explains why appellate courts do not identify
cognitive biases in judges.  Judges find it easier to identify with other judges than with juries.  Even though the
standard of review of judicial fact-finding is generally less deferential than the standard of review of jury fact-
finding, appellate courts are more likely to overturn the outcome of a jury trial than a bench trial. [FN176]
  Rather than reflecting a deeper psychological phenomenon, however, the split between courts identifying cognitive
illusions in juries but not in judges could reflect a belief that judges are not susceptible to systematic errors of
judgment.  If judges think juries are error prone they might actively seek cognitive illusions that influence juries,
whereas they simply trust judges.
  Although it is possible that judges make better decisions than juries, there is little evidence to support this belief.
As noted in the introduction, judges encounter little or no feedback on the quality of their decisions, making it
difficult for them to learn decision making on the job.  Furthermore, research indicates that judges, like everyone
else, are susceptible to illusions of judgment.  Several studies show that judges commit the hindsight bias *101 in
legal contexts. [FN177]  Also, a recent study of 167 federal magistrate judges shows that judges are subject to the
same range of cognitive illusions that influence other professionals, including framing effects, egocentric biases,
anchoring effects, errors caused by the representativeness heuristic, and the hindsight bias. [FN178]  Finally, as
noted earlier in this Article, analysis of judicial opinions in trusts cases suggests that even when writing publicly
available opinions, judges can fall prey to the hindsight bias.  The data indicate that judges are not immune to
illusions of judgment, although they might be less susceptible to them than laypersons.
  The distinction between insider and outsider perspectives also suggests that the legislature might play an important
role in adapting to cognitive illusions.  In the case of the hindsight bias, legislative action to adopt the UPIA has
proven necessary to wrest the court out of the grip of the hindsight bias.  Legislatures could also introduce new
biases as well.  In the case of the effect of anchoring, legislation creating damage caps creates anchors that might
unintentionally influence damage awards.  Legisla-tures are probably best viewed as both a source of outside reform
that might ameliorate bias, but might be subject to their own biases as well. [FN179]
  As a final implication of the problem of the tendency of insider perspectives to invite bias into the courtroom,
consider the issue of jury nullification. When a jury nullifies, it effectively decides both the law and the facts.  As
such, a jury that considers nullifying might be unable to identify any illusions of judgment that lead it to its verdict
choice.  Although what little empirical data that is available on nullification suggests that jurors take a principled
approach to nullification, [FN180] the analysis in this Article suggests that encouraging nullification is an invitation
to bias.
*102 Conclusion
  When courts do identify cognitive illusions, it is not altogether clear that they adopt sensible solutions.  Courts
might overreact to them, particularly if their abilities to identify cognitive illusions arises from a belief that juries are
incompetent.  For example, even if juries place too much weight on statistical evidence, as the representativeness
heuristic predicts, withholding such evidence from them might be inappropriate.  Absent an accurate quantification
of the size of the bias that representativeness heuristic creates relative to the normative influence of statistical
forensic evidence, a court could not be certain that withholding such evidence might do more to undermine the
accuracy of the process than admitting such evidence.  Likewise, without a quantification of the size of the hindsight
bias, it is not clear that withholding the fact of subsequent remedial measures is appropriate.
  Despite these problems, the adjudication process is better served when courts are aware of the cognitive biases that
influence decision making than when they disregard them or fall prey to them.  Courts might overreact to the
perception that illusions cloud judgment, but identifying a bias in judgment allows for public debate on the
appropriate remedy.  Whether it is the separation of making procedural rules from fact-finding or just judicial
skepticism about the jury process, something about the jury system enables courts to identify illusions of judgment
that might plague the legal system.  This separation reveals potential imperfections in the process, and possibly
inspires adaptations that might otherwise have been ignored.
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